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When Sir Frederick Pollock was the guest of the American
Bar Association twenty-five years ago, he wrote,1 "The interest
of our American brethren in English courts and procedure is
as inexhaustible as it is flattering." This interest does not seem
to have decreased during the intervening years. There is a
large and continually growing American literature on procedural
questions with special reference to the English practice.2 The
power of the judges, through the Rule Committee, to establish
their own rules of court; the system of Masters by which all
preliminary points are disposed of without unnecessary delay
and expense; the simple form of action which has destroyed all
the ingenious, and to some persons delightful, technicalities of
pleading; Order 14 which provides for summary judgment in
certain cases-all these have been noted and commented on by
American legal writers.
It is, therefore, all the more remarkable that virtually no
mention has been made by American writers of what is one of
the essential features of the English procedural system-the
rules by which costs are governed. Costs include all those
expenses of litigation which one party has to pay to the other.
They must be carefully distinguished from "fees" which have to
be paid by a litigant to the officers of the court.- Perhaps owing
to similarity of name the great difference between costs in Eng-
land and in America has escaped attention, for it is not infre-
* A paper read before the Juristic Society of Philadelphia. The writer
is indebted for valuable advice to Dir. John G. Archibald, Fellow of All
Souls College, Oxford, solicitor of the Supreme Court, and to Profcsor
Walter F. Dodd of the Yale Law School.
(1903) 19 L. Q. REv. 356.
See in particular ROSENBAUM, RULE IAMNG AumorrY (1917) ; Sun-
derland, An Appraisal of English Procedure (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 773;
Hewes, English Procedure (1929) 3 CONN. B. J. 13.
3 See BouvmR, LAW DICTIoNARY (Baldwin's ed. 1926) 239 under "Costs."
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quent to find in comparative law that identity of term conceals
fundamental variations in function. Moreover, the whole subject
is so technical and so badly arranged in the books that it is
difficult for any one who is not a practitioner to understand it.
If there were a publication in which the figures as to costs were
reported, the American observer would at once realize that here
was a matter of vital import. It is only necessary to mention
three recent cases. In Graigola Merthyr Co., Ltd. v. Swwnsea
Corporation,* the costs which the unsuccessful plaintiff had to
pay the defendant amounted to more than $350,000. In Barnato
v. Joel,5 although the action was ultimately compromised, the
defendants had to pay $200,000 costs. Both these cases were in
the Chancery Division. In the King's Bench Division, owing to
the fact that the cases do not as a rule involve expert evidence
or complicated accounts, the record figures are lower, but in Lek
v. Mathews,6 the defendant was awarded costs amounting to
more than $125,000. In view of these figures it is unnecessary
to stress the point that in England a litigant rarely brings or
defends an action without realizing that costs are a major con-
sideration and that they may greatly exceed the actual sum in
dispute.
The importance of costs in English law is shown by the space
this subject occupies in the law reports. In Bannehr and Port-
er's Guide to Costs, published in 1921, a leading practice book,
over two thousand cases are listed in the table of cases. Since
that date probably a hundred cases have been decided which will
have to be included in the next edition. Nor are these cases
merely perfunctory judgments of a few lines. In 1927 in Donald
Campbell & Co. v. Pollak,7 the House of Lords took ninety-five
pages in which to decide a question which concerned costs alone.
With a single exception this is the longest reported case in the
last ten years.8 That this interest in costs is not a modern
development is shown by Hullock's The Law of Costs, pub-
lished in 1793, for in that early book the table of cases includes
over a thousand references.
"The relative importance of costs to other procedural questions
is illustrated even more strikingly when we turn to practice
books. In The Annual Practice, commonly known as the White
Book, which contains an annotated collection of the statutes,
-"They are distinguished from fees in being an allowance to a party for
expenses incurred in conducting his suit; whereas fees are a compensation
to an officer for services rendered in the progress of the cause. Musser v.
Good, 11 9. & R. 248 [Pa. 1824]."
4 45 T. L. R. 219 (1929).
5 Reported in the London Times Newspaper, Dec. 21, 1928.
6 Unreported on this point.
7 [1927] A. C. 732.
8 See Note (1928) 44 L. Q. R.v. 11.
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orders, and rules relating to the general practice and procedure
of the Supreme Court, costs is by far the most important subject.
Twenty pages of the index are concerned with it alone, although
not more than ten pages are needed for any other topic. Order
65 of the Rules of Court,9 which is the chief, but not the sole,
Order dealing with costs, occupies with its annotations over one
hundred and forty pages while the average Order requires only
seventeen.
There is also a considerable English literature on the subject.
Besides a few well-known practitioners' books, there have been
published a large number of articles and notes in the legal
periodicals.0 Most of these deal, however, with various special
features of the subject rather than with the general principles
involved, and are therefore of no particular interest to the for-
eign reader.
In America, on the other hand, the subject of costs seems to
be a minor one. In Volume 7 of Rulizg Case Law, the chapter
dealing with costs is twenty-five pages long, while the next one
on co-tenancy occupies one hundred and seven pages. In Volume
9 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, Costs and Counties
are given exactly the same number of pages. A search through
the index of periodicals shows that not a single article of any im-
portance has been written on this subject, and only five American
references are given.
HISTORY OF COSTS
The history of costs in England is a comparatively simple
one, although a distinction must be drawn between the costs
awarded in the common-law courts and those given by equity.
The common-law rule as to costs is based entirely on statute.
As Pollock and Maitland say, in dealing with the law before the
time of Edward I:
"What some modern practitioners may think the most inter-
esting topic of the law was as yet much neglected. . . . It is
highly probable that in some actions in which damages were
claimed a successful plaintiff might often under the name of
"damages" obtain a compensation which would cover the costs
of litigation as well as all other harm that he had sustained; but
we know that this was not so where damages were awarded in
an action for land, and in many actions for land no damages, and
therefore no costs, could be had. It is only under statute that a
9 The procedure of the Supreme Court is governed by the Rules of the
Supreme Court, 1883, with later amendments and additions. The authority
to make rules of procedure is vested in the Rule Committee which includes
certain judges, barristers, and solicitors. The Rules are divided into 72
Orders. Each Order is subdivided into a number of rules.
10 Special reference may be made to numerous articles and notes in the
Law Journal, Law Times, and Solicitors' Journal.
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victorious defendant can claim costs, and at the time of which
we write statutes which allowed him this boon were novelties. In
expensarum causa victus victori condemnandus est-this is a
principleto which English, like Roman, law came but slowly." 1
If the plaintiff failed in his action, he was amerced pro falso
clamore; if he succeeded, the defendant was in misericordio, for
his unjust detention of the plaintiff's right, but was not liable
to the payment of any costs of suit, at least under that title."
The first statute which gave the plaintiff his costs, and the
one on which the whole law on the subject was based until 1875,
was the Statute of Gloucester (1275) 23 which provided that in
assizes of novel disseisin, writs of entry, mortdauncester, cosin-
age, aiel, and besaiel, "whereas before time Damages were not
taxed, but to the Value of the Issues of the Land; it is provided,
that the Demandant may recover against the Tenant the Costs
of his Writ purchased, together with the Damages abovesaid.
And this Act shall hold Place in all Cases where the Party is to
recover Damages." Although this statute referred only to "the
costs of his writ purchased," it was liberally interpreted. As
Lord Coke said, while indulging his fantasy in etymology:
"Here is expresse mention made but of the costs of his writ,
but it extendeth to all the legall cost of the suit, but not to the
costs and expences of his travell and losse of time, and therefore
costages commeth of the verb conster, and that again of the verb
constare, for these costages must constare to the court to be
legall costs and expences." 14
There was also a question whether this statute applied in cases
where damages were newly given by a statute subsequent to the
Statute of Gloucester where no damages were formerly recover-
able, but the later and prevailing view was that it did, even
though Coke doubted it. 1"
Apparently the litigious spirit was strong during the reign of
Elizabeth, for an attempt was made to limit "the infinite number
of small and trifling suits, commenced or prosecuted . . . in
her Highness Courts at Westminster . . . to the intolerable
vexation and charge of her Highness subjects" by providing in
1601 16 that in most personal actions if the debt or damages to
be recovered did not amount to forty shillings then the plaintiff
could not recover more costs than damages and might be awarded
less. This principle was extended to actions of slander in
112 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1911) 597.
12 HJLLOCK, LAW OF COSTS (1793) 1.
13 6 EDW. I. c. 1 (1275).
14 CoKE, 2d INSTrTUTES, 288.
it HuLLocK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 6; CoKE, op. cit. supra note 14, at
289.
16 43 ELIZ. c. 6, f. 2 (1601).
852
COSTS
1623,17 and in 1670 "1 to trespass where the title to the land was
not chiefly in question and to assault and battery. An interesting
attempt to use costs as a form of punishment was made in 1672 10
when a statute provided that a plaintiff could recover his full
costs of suit in an action of trespass against any "inferior trades-
men, apprentices and other dissolute persons" who trespassed
while hunting or fishing.01 In 1697 .-, full costs of suit were
given to a plaintiff whenever defendant's trespass was wilful
and malicious.
The law giving costs to the successful defendant developed
more slowly than that which gave costs to the plaintiff. Perhaps
this was due to the fact that the amercement of the unsuccessful
plaintiff was considered a sufficient punishment, although it
could not have been much of a satisfaction to the victorious
defendant. The Statute of Marlborough (1267),22 it is true,
provided that if a lord maliciously impleaded a feoffee when the
feoffment was made lawfully, the feoffee should be able to recover
damages and costs, "and the plaintiffs shall be grievously pun-
ished by amerciaments," but this was an isolated instance. It
was not until 1531 23 that a defendant was given costs in certain
specified actions such as trespass, case, debt, contract, covenant,
detinue and account. In 1607 24 the final step was taken when
it was provided that a defendant might recover costs in all cases
in which the plaintiff would have had them if he had recovered.
These statutes only applied to original proceedings. In 1487 -
a statute provided that if a judgment be affirmed on writ of
error, the writ be discontinued, or if the party suing it be non-
suited then the defendant in error was to have his costs. This
was followed by a number of statutes on the same subject.-
- 21 JAC. I, c. 16, f. 6 (1623).
1S 22 & 23 CAP. II, c. 9, f. 136 (1670).
19 4 & 5 W. & D1. c. 23, f. 10 (1672).
20 A series of cases followed on the question as to what was meant by
"inferior tradesmen." In Buxton v. Alingay, 2 Wils. 70 (1757), the defend-
ant was an apothecary. Bathurst, J. remarked: "And I am inclined to
think the parliament purposely penned the act in this obscure manner not
to disoblige their constituents, many of whom are tradesmen."
218 & 9 W. III, c. 11, f. 4 (1697).
22 52 HEN. III, c. 6 (1267).
2323 HEN. VIII, c. 15 (1531). This statute was followed by 8 ELIZ.
c. 2 (1566), which provided that "the defendant shall recover costs and
damage, where the plaintiff doth delay or discontinue his suit, or is nonsuit"
24 4 JAC. I, c. 3 (1607).
25 3 HEN. VII, c. 10 (1487). Apparently appeals for the purpose of delay
have a long history for this statute speaks of the defendant who "sueth a
writ or writs of error to adnul and reverse the said judgement, to the
intent only to delay execution of the said judgement."
213 C.A. II, c. 2, f. 10 (1661) ; 8 and 9 W. III, c. 11, f. 2 (1696) ; 4 AN.:N
c. 16, f. 25 (1705). The statute of William III contains these pregnant
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No alteration of note in the rules as to common-law costs took
place until 1875 when an important change in the principle on
which costs were awarded was made by the Supreme Court of
Judicature Acts, 1873 and 1875.27 In previous statutes costs
had followed the event, but Order 55 of the Rules of Court,
attached as the First Schedule to the Act of 1875, provided that,
with certain exceptions, "the costs of and incident to all pro-
ceedings in the High Court shall be in the discretion of the
Court." A victorious litigant might, therefore, be deprived of
his costs for good cause. This short nine line order was greatly
expanded when the Rules of Court were substantially rewritten
in 1883. With certain amendments and additions, these Rules
are in force today and will be considered in detail in the body of
this article in so far as they affect the question of costs. There
are also a great number of other statutes which contain par-
ticular provisions as to costs, but the general principles are to
be found in the Rules of Court.
The jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor in costs was essentially
different from that at common-law. 28  "The giving of costa in
equity," said Lord Hardwicke in Jones v. Coxeter, 2 "is entirely
discretionary, and is not at all conformable to the rule at law."
It has been a long disputed point whether the Chancellor's power
to award costs was an inherent one or was based on statute, 17
RICH. II, c. 6 (1394). The better view seems to be that the power
was inherent, and it is clear that the courts have acted on this
view.30  The great difference between equity and common-law
costs lay in the fact that in equity costs were in the discretion
of the court while at common-law they followed the event.
Therefore the 1875 Rules of Court, although placing equity costs
on a statutory basis, made no change of principle in them as
they did in common-law costs.
MACHINERY
Before discussing the present rules concerning costs as laid
down in the Rules of Court, 1883, it is necessary to say a few
words: "Foreasmuch as for want of a sufficient provision by law for the
payment of costs of suit, divers evil disposed persons are encouraged to
bring frivolous and vexatious actions, and others to neglect the due payment
of their debts, etc." See HULLOCK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 277t e sq.
2736 & 37 VicT. c. 66 (1873); 38 & 39 VICT. c. 77 (1875).
28See Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 28 F. (2d) 233
(C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
29 2 Atk. 400 (1742).
3oAndrews v. Barnes, 39 Ch. D. 133 (1888); Corporation of Burford v.
Lenthall, 2 Atk. 551 (1743). In the latter case Lord Hardwicke said: "It is
said the court ought to resort back to the original jurisdiction, in point of
costs, upon arguments chiefly drawn from cases of costs at common law....
But courts of equity have in all cases done it, not from any authority, but
from conscience, and arbitrio boni viri, as to the satisfaction on one side
or the other, on account of vexation."
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words about the machinery by means of which they are applied.
Costs in the Supreme Court are taxed by the six taxing Mas-
ters.31 The importance of their position is shown by the fact
that the senior taxing Master receives a salary of £1600 a year,
while the other five receive £1500. After a case is concluded,
the solicitor for the successful party prepares his bill of costs
in which every taxable item of expense incurred is included.
This bill may run into hundreds of pages. The other side may
agree to the bill, especially if there are few or no discretionary
items. An agreement saves the taxing fee payable to the court
which amounts to 2 per cent on the bill as taxed. In a great
many cases, however, there is no prospect of agreeing the bill.
This may happen for different reasons, a frequent one being
that the losing party's solicitor will not take the responsibility
of agreeing a heavy bill against his client. If there is no agree-
ment, the parties proceed to taxation. The Master provides a
hearing at which the solicitor for the opposing party may object
to any of the items. Each disputed item is discussed, and allowed
or disallowed by the Master. In exercising his discretion the
Master has before him all the relevant papers in the case so that
he may judge of the difficulty and importance of the point or
points involved, the character of the evidence required, the length
of the trial, etc. There is an appeal from the Master's decision
to the judge at chambers both on questions of law and of fact, -
but where the laster has exercised his discretion his judgment
will not, as a rule, be interfered with.33 A wide discretion is
given to him, and his decision as to the quantum, in the absence
of particular circumstances, is final." No appeal lies from the
order of the judge to the Court of Appeal without his leave "as
to costs only, which by law are left to the discretion of the
court." 37 An appeal can be taken without leave, however, on all
points of law, and on the question whether the judge had before
him materials upon which he could exercise his discretion.
3' The taxing Master, whose duties are concerned with questions of costs,
must be distinguished from the Mlaster, who deals with preliminary qucz-
tions of practice and procedure.
32 Order 65, r. 27, reg. 41 provides: "Any party who may be dis atisfied
with the certificate or allocatur of the taxing officer, as to any item or part
of an item which may have been objected to as aforesaid, may within
fourteen days . . . apply to a judge at chambers for an order to r;vkiw the
taxation as to the same item or part of an item, and the judge may
thereupon make such order as the judge may think just."
33 See 2 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (190S) 418; Re Maddoc: [1S99]
2 Ch. 588; Spalding v. Gamage [1914] 2 Ch. 405.
34In Estate of Ogilvie, Ogilvie v. Massey [1910) P. 241, Cozens-
Hardy M. R. said: "The taxing Mlaster is the person whose duty it is to
decide questions of quantum, and it is not right for the judge to interfere
in such a matter." Cf. Smith v. Buller, L. R. 19 Eq. 473, 474 (1S75).
3" The Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & IG
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WHAT ITEMS MAY BE RECOVERED AS COSTS
It is common understanding in America that the difference
between the American and the English rules as to costs lies in
the fact that under the English system the successful party may
recover the charges he has to pay his own lawyer. This is both
an over and an understatement, for English costs rarely include
the whole payment made to the barrister and solicitor while they
also cover many other items not allowed in America.
In laying down the principles on which taxing Masters shall
allow costs, Order 65, r. 27, reg. 29 36 provides that all necessary
expenses shall be included, but that all costs "incurred or
increased through over-caution, negligence or mistake or by pay-
ment of special fees to coungel or special charges or expenses to
witnesses or other persons, or by other unusual expenses" shall
be disallowed. How this rule works in practice can be best seen
by considering the various items usually found in a bill of costs.
(a) Fees paid to court. The fees which have been paid to the
court, including fees for summons, on appearance, commence-
ment of cause, entering and setting down case for trial, interloc-
utory applications, on entering a judgment, etc., can be
recovered from the losing party in full unless they have been
unnecessarily incurred. If, however, the plaintiff could have
achieved the same end by adopting a less expensive form of pro-
cedure then he will not be allowed the additional amount."'
(b) Fees paid to the solicitor.8 For the purposes of taxation
the solicitor must deliver an itemized bill for his services which
GEO. V, c. 49, § 31 (1) h (1927), replacing Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37
VIcT. c. 66, § 49 (1873), enacts that, "No appeal shall lie without the leave
of the court or judge making the order from an order of the High Court
or any judge thereof made ... as to costs only, which by law are left to the
discretion of the court."
36 Rosenbaum, op. cit. supra note 2, at 146: "This is now the kernel of
the whole rule. It is the touchstone which the taxing master can apply
to every item in a bill of costs."
7Johnson v. Evans, 60 L. T. 29 (1888). Thus a person applying for
a special jury shall not have on taxation any further allowance than he
would be entitled to if the case had been tried by a common jury, unless
the judge certifies immediately after the verdict that the case was proper
to be tried by a special jury.
38 In explaining to American lawyers the difference between barristers or
counsel, these terms being practically interchangeable, on the one hand,
and solicitors, on the other, it is the practice to say that the barrister Is
the trial lawyer while the solicitor is the office lawyer. This is far from
accurate. The solicitor deals directly with the client while the barrister is
retained by the solicitor. In non-litigious matters the solicitor may himself
draft all necessary papers, but if the matter is difficult or important he will
retain a barrister who is a specialist in the practice of conveyancing,
probate, company law, etc. He may also ask for a barrister's opinion on
any doubtful point of law on which a client consults him. In litigious
matters, the solicitor interviews the witnesses and obtains all other neces-
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has been derisively compared to an apothecary's bill. He does
not charge a lump sum, as does the American lawyer, which is
figured on the amount at issue, the difficulty of the case, etc.,
but he must charge separately for every thing he or his clerks
do.- What is even more remarkable from the American stand-
point is that the charges for most items are fixed by statute.
Thus the solicitor receives a fixed sum for each letter he may
write, a routine letter being 3s. 4d. and a special letter 5s. The
only item which is discretionary is the "Instructions for Brief."
This varies with the difficulty and laboriousness of the case and
with its importance. The principles underlying this odd system
of remuneration were settled when a solicitor was in fact little
more than a person skilled in the details and clerical work of
lawsuits and payment was made for services mainly of a clerical
nature. It is now out of date and is the most criticized part
of the English system.40 As the amount for these various items
is fixed by statute, the taxing Master is only concerned with the
various steps taken by the solicitor, and not with his charges
for them. Thus, for example, if the solicitor's bill includes an
item for ten letters written by the solicitor, the Master's sole
duty is to determine whether it was necessary to write this
number. With the exception of the "Instructions for Brief,"
the difficulty or importance of the case is only relevant in deter-
mining what steps were necessary; it does not affect the amount
to be charged for each step.
sary evidence. He summarises this in a document known as the brief,
which is sent to the barrister with the fee for appearing in the case marked
on the outside. Where there are difficult questions of law involved, the
barrister settles the pleadings. As barristers have an exclusive right of
audience as advocates in the House of Lords, Privy Council, Supreme Court
of Judicature, Central Criminal Court and Assizes, it is necessary for
them to be briefed in all trials in these courts. In other courts, such as
the County Courts, a solicitor may himself appear for his client, but if the
case is an important one he may brief a barrister. It is the practice to
brief two, or even three, barristers in all important cases, the, senior of
whom is known as the leader.
Barristers are either "utter" barristers, more frequently called "junior"
barristers, or King's Counsel. King's Counsel are barristers who have been
"called within the bar," occupying the front benches in the auditorium of
the court. Technically they are Crown officials, appointed, on the advice
of the Lord Chancellor, by Letters-Patent of the King, and, until quite
recently, they could not appear for any client against the Crown without
a special license. A King's Counsel, or K.C. for short, is called a "sill"
as he wears a silk gown, while the junior barrister wears one made of stuff.
See JENKs, THE BooK op ENGLISH LAW (1928) 83.
39 The bill which the solicitor sends to his own client, where there is no
question of taxation, is a lump sum bill. However, this, unless there is a
special agreement to the contrary, can be objected to by the client. He
can insist on an itemized bill, and then tax it against his solicitor.
40 The Earl of Birkenhead, Costs (1925) 60 LAW JOUNNAL S9.
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(c) Fees paid to counsel. Where counsel's fees are concerned
an entirely different principle has to be applied, for a barrister
receives payment for his work more in accordance with the
American system. When he is retained by the solicitor, a sum
is marked on the brief he receives which is determined by the
eminence of his position, the difficulty of the case, etc. This fee
will not necessarily be allowed in whole when the Master taxes
costs against the other party. He will consider whether it was
necessary under the circumstances for the party to have one,
two, or in rare cases, three counsel; 41 whether it was necessary
to retain a King's Counsel at a fee of one hundred guineas in
addition to junior counsel, rather than a junior counsel alone at
a fee of twenty guineas. Perhaps a medical comparison may
make this clearer. A patient, suffering from an ordinary cold,
instead of calling in a family doctor who charges an ordinary
fee for each visit, employs a specialist who charges a much
higher one. The specialist's fee may be a perfectly fair and
reasonable one although, under the circumstances, it was not
necessary for the patient to incur the expense. Thus a taxing
Master may disallow a large part of the fee paid to eminent
counsel on the ground that it was unnecessary for the party to
incur it, without holding that the fee itself was unreasonable.
Recently the Court of Appeal, of its own motion, in dismissing
an interlocutory appeal with costs, ordered that the fees of lead-
ing counsel were not to be allowed. Lord Justice Scrutton
remarked that he regarded Mr. Jowitt, K.C., who was briefed
for the respondent, as a "super luxury," and said that if his
client took the unnecessary step of briefing him he must pay for
the luxury.42
(d) Necessary expenses paid to witnesses. These include both
traveling and living expenses, and a sum representing compensa-
tion for loss of tinfe. In fixing the amount to be allowed on
taxation, the Master will take into consideration the social stand-
ing of the witness; whether, for example, it was reasonable for
him to travel first or third class, to take a taxicab or a tram.13
In cases where expert witnesses are called, the item for witnesses
may prove a formidable one, for the winning party may recover
the necessary fees he has paid to his experts. These may include
not only payment for the time spent in court but also for the
time spent in qualifying to give evidence. 44 So the fees of a
41 Peel v. London & North Western Ry., [1907] 1 Ch. 607; Easton v.
London Joint Stock Bank, 38 Ch. D. 25 (1888); Kirkwood v. Webster, 9
Ch. D. 239 (1878).
42 See Comment (1928) 67 LAw JOURNAL 174.
4 3 Re Working Men's Mutual Society, 21 Ch. D. 831 (1882) ; Parkinson
v. Atkinson, 31 L. J. C. P. 199 (1862); East Stonehouse Local Board v.
Victoria Brewery Co., [1895] 2 Ch. 514.
44 See BANNEHR & PORTER, GUIDE TO COSTS (12th ed. 1921) 837.
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chemist, which amounted to £330, for time occupied in making
experiments preparatory to trial, were allowed to the party who
called him.45 In chancery cases, especially where scientific ques-
tions are involved, expert evidence frequently constitutes the
largest part of the bill of costs. In a recent case this item ran
into thousands of pounds.41 It is in the discretion of the taxing
Mlaster to decide whether he will allow the fees of all or only
some of the expert witnesses; if a party calls more witnesses
than are absolutely necessary he cannot recover their fees from
his opponent.
(e) All other necessary expenses. The Mlaster will allow all
items which were necessarily incurred in the preparation as
well as in the presentation of the case. Thus the cost of employ-
ing an agent to obtain evidence 4 7 can be charged. Similarly
plans, models, photographs, copies of documents, translations,
etc. may constitute items in the bill.48 There is only one item on
which the rules seem to be illiberal, and that is on the question
of shorthand notes. Perhaps this is due to the English prejudice
against typewriting. It is only in exceptional cases that the
expense of taking shorthand notes of evidence can be recovered
by a party.49
It will be apparent from the above list that the English rules
are very liberal in their conception of what constitutes costs.
They will include not only all expenses necessarily incurred at
the trial, but also those which the plaintiff or the defendant had
to meet in preparing his case. Therefore a plaintiff who only
discontinues his action immediately before trial, or a defendant
who pays at the last moment may nevertheless have incurred
costs of many thousand pounds. 0
45 Leonhardt v. Kalle, 39 SOL. J. 524 (1895).
4 Graicola Merthyr Co., Ltd. v. Swansea Corporation, stepra note 4.
- Slingsby v. Attorney General, [1918] P. 236.4SBatley v. Kynock, L. R. 20 Eq. 632 (1875); Mackley v. Chillingworth,
2 C. P. D. 273 (1877); Re Bowes, Strathmore (Earl of) v. Vane, [1900]
2 Ch. 251.
49Earl de la Warr v. Miles, 19 Ch. D. 80 (1378); Hebert v. Royal Society
of Medicine, 56 SOL. J. 107 (1911); Pilling v. Joint Stock Institute, Ltd.,
73 L. T. 570 (1895).
50 The amount to be allowed for each of the above items depends upon
whether the costs are "party and party" or "solicitor and client" cozts.
As a rule only "party and party" costs are allowed. They comprise only
those expenses which are strictly necessary in the action, while "solicitor
and client" costs include, in addition, many things, which although not
essential, are, nevertheless, advisable under the circumstances. As Parker
J. said in Peel v. London & North Western Ry., [1907] 1 Ch. 607, 613:
"One is the question of doing the litigation, if I may use the expression, as
cheaply as a reasonable man can do it, because possibly someone else may
have to pay the expense, and the other is a question what a man spending
his own money would reasonably be expected to do in the particular cir-
cumstances of the case." So agents entitled to an indemnity from their
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WHEN COSTS WILL BE ALLOWED
It has been comparatively easy to state what items will be
allowed in a bill of costs. It is a far more difficult problem to
state in any logical form under what circumstances costs will
be allowed, for the simple rule that costs follow the judgment as
of course, which is the practice in some American states, does
not exist in England. The Rules of the Supreme Court, like
most English institutions, are more remarkable for their prac-
tical efficiency than for their symmetry. Although Order 65 is
entitled "Costs," this gives only a part of the provisions as to
costs, some of the more important being scattered more or less
haphazard among the other orders. As a result an attempt to
give a picture of the English practice as to costs is like fitting
a jigsaw puzzle together. Such an attempt to deal with the
question as a whole must be made, however, so that the full
significance and fundamental importance of costs in English
procedure can be realized.
COSTS OF THE ACTION AS A WHOLE
The most important single provision on costs is found in
Order 65, r. 1:
"Subject to the provisions of the Act and these Rules, the
costs of and incident to all proceedings in the Supreme Court,
including the administration of estates and trusts, shall be in
the discretion of the court or judge; Provided that nothing herein
contained shall deprive an executor, administrator, trustee, or
mortgagee who has not unreasonably instituted or carried on or
resisted any proceedings, of any right to costs out of a particular
estate or fund to which he would be entitled according to the
rules hitherto acted upon in the Chancery Division; Provided
also that, where any action, cause, matter, or issue is tried with
a jury, the costs shall follow the event, unless the judge by whom
such action, cause, matter, or issue is tried, or the court shall,
for good cause, otherwise order."
principals are entitled to be indemnified against their solicitor and client
costs (Williams v. Lister, (1913) W. N. 295), but they only get party and
party costs of compelling the indeninity (Simpson v. British Industries
Trust Ltd., 39 T. L. R. 286 (1923) ). It is doubtful whether the power to
allow solicitor and client costs exists in matters of common-law jurisdic-
tion (see ANNUAL PRACTICE (1929) 1436), but in equity they are frequently
allowed, e. g., to trustees and executors. Solicitor and client costs do' not
necessarily include all the charges which a solicitor is entitled to make
against his client, for the client may have instructed the solicitor to incur
unusual expenses.
Costs may also be allowed on a higher scale for special grounds, such
as the peculiar difficulty of the case. See Order 65, r. 9. The court also
has power to order one party to pay to the other a fixed sum in lieu of
taxed costs. Willmott v. Barber, Ch. D. 774 (1881). This is often applied
in smaller actions of the running-down type, and in actions entered in the
Short Cause list where with the court's approval settlements are often
effected before trial.
COSTS
This Order gives full discretion to the judge as to costs where
the case is tried without a jury, but where the case is tried with
a jury the costs must follow the event-' unless there is good
cause for refusing them. In practice there seems to be little
distinction between "discretion" and "good cause," except that
the judge cannot refuse to give costs merely because he dis-
agrees with the verdict of the jury.-"- He may, however, refuse
costs to a successful plaintiff in a libel action if the plaintiff
"brought the whole thing on himself" by actions which excited
"'very just suspicion on the part of the neighbours." - Similarly
a plaintiff, in a personal injury case, who makes an exorbitant
claim which he knows is partly based on false evidence, may be
deprived of costs even though he recovers substantial damages.5'
A successful defendant may also be deprived of his costs if his
conduct has made the action reasonable* On the other hand
the judge need not refuse costs because the plaintiff has recov-
ered only nominal damages,* and cannot refuse them solely on
the ground that the defendant has set up a technical defence. 7
In using his discretion where the case is tried without a jury,
the judge must use it judicially; thus he cannot determine the
question merely on grounds of benevolence or sympathy,53 nor
because the unsuccessful party's case has great moral, although
no legal, merits.59 Where a party successfully enforces a legal
right and in no way misconducts himself, he is entitled to costs.
On the other hand a party who brings a vexatious or unnecessary
action, even if he succeeds to some extent, may be ordered to
.1 The headnote to Reid, Hewitt & Co. v. Joseph, [1913] A. C. 717 reads:
"The expression 'the costs shall follow the event' ... means that the party
who on the whole succeeds in the action gets the general costs of the action,
but that, where the action involves separate issues, whether arising under
different causes of action or under one cause of action, the costs of any
particular issue go to the party who succeeds upon it.
"An issue, in this sense, need not go to the whole cause of action, but in-
cludes any issue which has a direct and definite event in defeating the claim
to judgment in whole or in part."
5 Wight v. Shaw, 19 Q. B. D. 396 (1888). Lord Esher, LT. R.: 'He
could have no jurisdiction to interfere with the costs on the ground that
the verdict was wrong. For this purpose the verdict must be assumed to
be right."
5 Harnett v. Vise, 5 E%. D. 307 (1879).
5 4 Pearman v. Burdett-Coutts, 3 T. L. R. 719 (187).
Sr5 Myers v. Financial News, 5 T. L. R. 42 (ISS9); Ritter v. Godfrey
[1920] 2 K. B. 47; Bostock v. Ramsey Urban Council, [1900] 2 K. B. 625.
-5 Moore v. Gill, 4 T. L. R. 738 (1888).
5' Granville v. Firth, 72 L. J. K. B. 152 (1903); Civil Service Cooperative
Society v. General Steam Navigation Co., [19031 2 K. B. 756; Elm v.
Hedges, 95 L. T. 148 (1906).
58 Kierson v. Joseph L. Thompson & Sons, Ltd., [1913] 1 K. B. 587; Bev-
ington v. Perks, [1925] 2 K. B. 229.
59 Re Birkbeck Building Soc., 108 L. T. 211 (1913).
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pay the whole costs of the other side 5  In exercising his dis-
cretion, the judge may take into consideration the fact that the
claim is grossly exorbitant, that the plaintiff has unfairly
charged a trustee with fraud, that some of the evidence offered
is clearly false, that the plaintiff by his improper actions has
caused the defendant to act as he did, that the action is brought
out of spite or purely for political motives; or, on the other hand,
that a successful defendant has by his conduct made the action
reasonable.61 Although the improper conduct may have taken
place before the actual commencement of the action, it must be
conduct relative to the question between the parties."
Thus the trial judge has wide discretion as to costs, and may
by this means punish a party who has unfairly brought or de-
fended an action. It is not infrequent that the plaintiff, although
successful in the action, has to pay the defendant's costs in
whole or in part. In such a case he will realize that his victory
is indeed a Pyhrric one, for the bill of costs may greatly exceed
the actual sum in dispute. This is a power which, if wisely
exercised, enables a judge to prevent the use of the courts as
machinery for extortion or chicanery.
COSTS AND THE CONDUCT OF LITIGATION
It is not only as a means of discouraging unfair and unneces-
sary litigation that costs have proved so efficacious in Englalid.
They may be of even greater use in controlling each step of the
case from summons to final appeal-in preventing prolixity,
delay, misjoinder of parties, the demand for the production of
undisputed evidence, and the taking of appeals as a matter of
course. To make this clear it is necessary to classify as far as
possible the various orders which contain references to costs.
(a) Prolixity. One of the major sins of the ancient forms of
action was their immoderate prolixity. The pleader, for fear
that he might have forgotten a necessary allegation, repeated
everything at interminable length. The Rules of the Supreme
Court provide means for stamping out this nuisance. Therefore
Order 2, r. 2 provides that a party using any forms of writs and
indorsements more prolix than the prescribed forms shall bear
the cost thereof himself, and Order 19, r. 2 makes the same pro-
vision in the case of statement of claim, defense, set-off, counter-
60 Harris v. Petherick, 4 Q. B. D. 611 (1879); Fane v. Pane, 13 Ch. P.
228 (1879). But a successful defendant cannot, under any circumstanccs,
be made liable to pay the whole costs of the action if the plaintiff was not
entitled to bring the action. Dicks v. Yates, 18 Ch. D. 76 (1881).
(1 See cases cited ANNUAL PRACTICE (1929) 1320.
62 Edmund v. Martell, 24 T. L. R. 25 (1907); Harnett v. Vise, ,upia
note 53.
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claim or reply.63 "Such statements shall be as brief as the nature
of the case will admit," and where there is unnecessary prolixity
the taxing Master may, either at the instance of any party, or-
a remarkable provision-on his own motion without any request,
charge tfle loquacious party. In practice the court rarely acts
except on the application of a party, and the party does not as
a rule care about the prolixity of his opponent's pleadings if he
has no other objection to them. It is, however, a convenient rule
in terrorem to prevent outrageous cases of loose pleading.
(b) Seandalous matter. It usually proves expensive to plead
or otherwise allege scandalous matter for under Order 19, r. 27
the judge may order it struck out in a pleading and also order
the offending party to pay the full costs of the application," and
under Order 38, r. 11 a similar provision applies to affidavits03
(c) Delay. In England it is impossible to delay a trial indefi-
nitely by getting adjournments, for if there is not good ground
for the application it will be refused. If the application is made
a reasonable time in advance, and the judge finds that there is
good cause, it will usually be allowed without an order as to
costs, but if a party only asks for an adjournment when the case
is called, then under Order 36, r. 34 he will generally get it only
at the price of paying for the costs thrown away -c As these
costs may include additional fees to counsel, solicitors' charges
for attending court, etc., and all the added expenses of witnesses,
it is clear that such an application will not be made lightly. A
further- provision as to delay is found in Order 65, r. 5 which
provides that a solicitor may be made personally to pay all costs
due to the delay of a trial caused by him in certain specified
ways, such as failing to attend the trial or omitting to deliver
necessary papers.07
(d) Joinder of parties and actions, and inte'pleader. The
English rules as to joinder of parties and causes of action are
more liberal than are those in the United States, and by means of
this liberality justice is done where the stricter technical rules
may delay or hinder the action. The English rules, however,
are carefully guarded by provisions as to costs so that a party
shall not suffer because of an improper joinder. So under Order
16, r. 161" a defendant, although unsuccessful, shall be entitled to
13 Stephen v. Laurie, 12 L. J. Ch. 71 (1843); Hanslip v. Kitton, 3 Jur.
(N. s.) 835 (1862).
6"Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Society, 45 L. J. C. P. 663 (1876);
Brooking v. Alaudslay, 55 L. T. 343 (1886).
": Re Jessopp, (1910) W. N. 128.
61, Lydall v Martinson, 5 Ch. D. 780 (1877).
67 Shorter v. Tod Heatly, (1894) W. N. 21; Lewis v. Cory, (1906) W. N.
95.
r' For general principle see Searle v. Matthews, 19 Q. B. D. 77 (18S7);
Goodman v. Blake, 19 Q. B. D. 77 (1887).
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his costs occasioned by the joining of any person as plaintiff
who shall not be found entitled to relief. Under Order 16, r. 4
all persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right
to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in
the alternative, and under Order 16, r. 7 where the plaintiff is
in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress he
may join two or more defendants in the alternative. In com-
menting on these rules a learned writer has said: 09 "This right
is, of course, subject to an obligation of a plaintiff to pay the
costs of any person who is cleared of liability. Costs, it should
be remembered, are a real compensation in England, as they
include counsel fees." To prevent multiplicity of actions Order
16, r. 48 establishes what is known as third party procedure. A
defendant who claims to be entitled to contribution or indemnity
over against any person not a party to the action may by leave
of the court serve a third-party notice. In these cases the ques-
tion of costs may be a peculiarly difficult one, so by Order 16, r.
54 the judge "may order any one or more to pay the costs of
any other, or others, or give such direction as to costs as the
justice of the case may require." 70 Order 57, r. 1 provides for
relief by way of interpleader with careful provisions as to costs
in Order 57, r. 15 and Order 57, r. 17. To prevent multiplicity
of actions and to enable parties to finish their disputes as soon
as possible Order 18, r. 1 provides that a plaintiff may unite in
the same action several causes of action, but if the judge finds
that such causes of action cannot conveniently be tried together
he may order separate trials. The plaintiff must be careful in
his joinder for if such an order is made he will, as a rule, under
Order 18, r. 9 have to pay the costs of the order and the conse-
quential amendments.
(e) Summary procedure. Order 14 which provides for sum-
mary judgments by means of specially indorsed writs has been
the subject of favorable comment in America, and has been
adopted in substance by a number of the states.n But here
again, any possible abuse is met by a provision in Order 14, r. 9
(b) as to costs. In order to discourage plaintiffs from making
unnecessary application for summary judgment, it is provided
that if a plaintiff makes an application where the case is not
within the Order or when lie knew that the defendant relied oh
a contention which would entitle him to unconditional leave to
defend, "the application may be dismissed with costs, to be paid
69 ROSENBAUM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 52.
70 Bates v. Burchell, (1884) W. N. 108; Morgan v. Hardy, 17 Q. B. D.
770 (1886); Blore v. Ashby, 42 Ch. D. 682 (1889).




forthwith by the plaintiff." 72 The Master, instead of dismissing
the application, may, however, treat it as a summons for direc-
tions, and give directions as though the summons were taken
out under Order 30. It is interesting to note that in Connecticut,
where the judges of the Superior Court have recently adopted
new rules of practice relating to summary judgments, the Judi-
cial Council has recommended that the General Statutes be
amended so that "double costs, including a reasonable counsel
fee to be taxed by the court" may be allowed to the plaintiff
when the defendant files an affidavit without just cause, or for
the purpose of delay.73
(f) Interrogatories. As has been frequently noted, the Eng-
lish rules of procedure are based on the theory that a party com-
ing to trial should not be taken by surprise. The purpose of the
courts is to administer justice and not to referee a game between
two players. Therefore, an attempt is made to prevent either
party from gaining an unfair advantage over the other, and, as
far as possible, the contestants are not allowed to keep cards up
their sleeves. As Professor Sunderland has said: "Our [the
American] bar has always been inclined to fear and distrust
disclosure before trial. They have thought it would tend to
produce framed-up cases and perjured testimony. . . . The
spirit of the times calls for disclosure, not concealment, in every
field-in business dealings, in governmental activities, in inter-
national relations, and the experience of England makes it clear
that the courts need no longer permit litigating parties to raid
one another from ambush." 74
The English Rules by Order 31, r. 1 provide that in any cause
the plaintiff or defendant may, by leave of the court, deliver in-
terrogatories in writing to the opposite party. The practice is to
issue a summons to which are attached a number of interroga-
tories and to ask the Mlaster to allow them. The other side
makes his objections and in the end a certain number of inter-
rogatories are left, eight or ten being a fair number to get
allowed. These the party interrogated has to answer. If a
party should set out a tremendous list of interrogatories the
Mlaster -would make him bear the costs under Order 31, r. 3 which
provides that if "such interrogatories have been exhibited unrea-
sonably, vexatiously, or at improper length" the costs occasioned
thereby "shall be paid in any event by the party in fault." Order
31, r. 26 provides that any party seeking discovery by interroga-
tories or otherwise may be required to give security for the costs
of the discovery.
72 Symon & Co. v. Palmer's Stores, [1912] 1 K. B. 259; Lagos v. Grun-
waldt, [1910] 1 K. B. 41.
7 3 
FIRsT REPORT OF THE JUDICLL COUNCIL OF CONN:ECTICUT (1928) 31.
74 Sunderland, op. cit. supra note 2, at 775.
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Compare with these rules the statement as to interrogatories
in the First Report, 1925, of the Judicial Council of Massachu-
setts:
"It is the practice today of some members of the Bar to file an
unconscionable number of interrogatories in the first instance,
in order to forestall evasive answers, and to avoid having to go
to the court for leave to file supplementary interrogatories. As
many as 200 to 300 interrogatories are not uncommon, and in
one instance 2,258 interrogatories have been filed in the first
instance. Of course, as a rule defendants object to answering
so great a number of interrogatories, and the result is that in
such instance the court has to hear a motion to compel answers
and to wade through the unconscionable number of interroga-
tories that have been filed." 75
(g) Evidence. Closely related to the rules as to interroga-
tories, but quite distinct in purpose, are the rules which require
a party to admit documents offered and specific facts alleged by
the opposing party. The purpose is to save the time of the
court and reduce the expenses of the party offering the evidence
by obtaining these admissions. There has been continued and
bitter complaint in America that uider the rules of evidence at
present established, a party may be forced to prove a fact not
really in dispute, at great expense of time and money. It is
difficult to imagine a more gloomy picture than that drawn by
Professor Morgan's Committee on Evidence:
"But what is the generally current American practice? In
his pleadings each party attempts to keep the other as much in
the dark as possible. The plaintiff often alleges much more than
he expects to be able to prove in order to cover every possible
contingency of the discovery of additional evidence before trial,
and thus makes it necessary for the defendant to prepare to
meet entirely unfounded claims which will never be pressed. The
defendant, when he can do so without perjury, puts the plaintiff
to the proof of every allegation regardless of whether he really
denies or doubts its existence. And at the trial each counsel
constantly interrupts the story of opposing witnesses by objec-
tions, most of them devoid of either technical validity or sub-
stantial merit. And each party insists upon a strict observance
of the rules of evidence and procedure in the proof of formal
matters and of evidentiary facts as to the truth of which there
,is really no question." 76
To. remedy this evil the Committee recommended the enact-
ment of the following statute:
75 At 42.
76 THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM, p. 2. By Pro-
fessor Edmund M. Morgan and a committee appointed by The Legal Re-
search Committee of The Commonwealth Fund.
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"Any rule of evidence need not be enforced if the trial judge,
on inquiry made of counsel or otherwise, finds that there is no
bo'na fide dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-
existence of the facts which the offered evidence tends to prove,
even though such fact may be in issue under the plead-
ings. . . .
It is no part of this article to criticize this proposed statute
but two points may be made; first, that under this rule a party
will not know until the last moment whether or not he will have
to prove a fact, and will therefore have to prepare his evidence
in any case, and secondly, the whole plan will break down under
"'a spineless judge." 78 It is strange that the committee made no
reference to the English rules, for the law of evidence is sub-
stantially the same in both countries. Nevertheless in England
trials are not held up for days while facts not in dispute are
being laboriously proved nor are plaintiffs forced to abandon
just claims because the cost of proving the facts is prohibitive.
It is in the word "cost" that the answer can be found.
Order 21, r. 9 provides that where any allegations of fact are
denied or not admitted by the defence, when in the opinion of
the judge they should have been admitted, the defendant may
be charged with the extra costs occasioned thereby. This rule
may at times prove of value, for as Fletcher Moulton, L. J. aid,"0
"by rashly traversing statements which are obviously true, much
unnecessary expense may be caused." Under this rule a party
may still put his opponent to the full proof of all material facts,
but if he does so unnecessarily he will have to pay for his funO
Of even greater practical value in preventing unnecessary
evidence is Order 32, r. 2 and r. 4. Rule 2 permits either party
to call upon the other to admit any document. In case of unrea-
sonable refusal to do so, the party refusing will have to pay the
costs of proving the document, whatever the result of the cause
may be.-" On the other hand, no costs of proving any document
shall be allowed unless such notice is given. Rule 4 has a similar
7,Ibid. 6.
78Ibid. 7: "It must be conceded that with a spineless judge, it may
work little good; but its possibilities of harm are nil."
79 Lever Brothers v. Associated Newspapers, [1907] 2 K. B. 626, 628.
Fletcher Moulton L. J.: "Either party to an action has full power to put
in issue any matters alleged by his opponent. He does so at the peril of
having to pay costs."
80 The Connecticut Judicial Council in its First Report, at 71, recom-
mends the enactment of the following act:
"Allegations or denials made without reasonable cause and found untrue
shall subject the party pleading the same to the payment of such reason-
able expenses, including a reasonable counsel fee, to be taxed by the court,
as may have been necessarily incurred by the other party by reason of such
untrue pleading."81 Dudley, etc. Co. v. Dudley Corp., (1906) W. N. 67.
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provision which enables a party to call on the other to admit
"any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice." 82 Thus,
for example, a party who calls on his opponent to prove a busi-
ness account which is not really in dispute may be required to
pay the cost of the proof. Compare with this rule the statement
by Professor Morgan's committee: "The law, then, if properly
presented and understood, furnishes a method by which most
business accounts can be proved; by a slight extension all could
be proved. But at what an exorbitant cost!" 83 The English rules
place this exorbitant cost on the party who unreasonably puts
his opponent to the proof.
It is interesting to read the comment of the Massachusetts
Judicial Council on rules 2 and 4:
"These two English rules are set forth below. This practice is
provided for in Massachusetts by G. L., c. 231, s. 69, and Common
Law Rule 37 of the Superior Court. But as no penalty is pro-
vided in either the statute or the rule, in case the admission is
not made when there are no real grounds for contesting the facts
or the documents, the statute and the rule are not as helpful as
they should be." 84
(h) Estate and probate actions. In common-law actions
costs as a rule follow the event, but in equity and probate actions
concerning estates, etc., the more usual order is that the costs
be paid out of such estate. In these cases the court may be faced
with a number of difficult and apparently conflicting problems--
it must protect the estate; it must not, on the one hand, unduly
penalize the bona fide but unsuccessful claimant while on the
other hand giving the successful one more than his share; it
must control the trustee and executor. The Rules of Court have
certain provisions which serve as guides in these difficult situa-
tions. It is only possible here to mention some of the more
important ones.
Order 65, r. 14-A warns trustees and executors against need-
less litigation by providing that "the costs occasioned by any
unsuccessful claim or unsuccessful resistance to any claim to any
property shall not be paid out of the estate unless the judge shall
otherwise direct." 85 The practice is that if the claim or resist-
ance was reasonable the judge will otherwise direct.
Order 65, r. 14-B is self-explanatory: "The costs of inquiries
to ascertain the person entitled to any legacy, money, or share,
or otherwise incurred in relation thereto, shall be paid out of
such legacy, money or share, unless the judge shall otherwise
direct."
82 Crawford v. Chorley, (1883) W. N. 198.
83Supra note 76, at 57.
84 FIRsT REPORT (1925) 43.
85 If the parties are sui juris they can enter into an agreement to tho
contrary. Prince v. Haworth, [1905] 2 K. B. 768.
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Order 21, r. 18, as amended in 1898, is an interesting one.
Before the amendment, a party opposing a will had the right to
insist that the will be proved "in solemn form of law," without
having to pay the costs of the proceeding. Since the amendment
the judge may order him to pay the costs if there were no
reasonable grounds for opposing the will.60
Further provisions as to probate costs are found in Order 65,
r. 14-C and 14-D, etc.
(i) Appeals. In an article entitled "The Problem of Appellate
Review" 11 Professor Sunderland emphasizes the well-known fact
that in England there are many less appeals than in the United
States. He suggests that this is due largely to the superior
quality of the English trial judges as contrasted with the Ameri-
can ones: "It may be that the immense volume of appeals which
we suffer from is an indication of a want of confidence in our-
courts of first instance." I' Undoubtedly the point which Profes-
sor Sunderland makes is a material and important one, but it is
doubtful whether even in England a defeated litigant has any
particular confidence in the judge who has decided against him.
May it not be suggested that one of the reasons why an English-
man does not appeal, unless he thinks that he has a good chance
of winning, is based on the fact that if he loses his appeal he
will, as a general rule, have to pay his opponent's costs of appeal?
These will include not only the expense of preparing the record,
but also, as in the trial court, all the necessary expenses incurred
by the successful party, including counsel fees and solicitors'
charges. As the costs in even a simple appeal may easily amount
to £100 or £200 it is obvious that a litigant will hesitate before
taking this step. Of course, where the amount in dispute is
large or the point at issue is an important one, costs wilt not
prove a serious deterrent, even if the chances of reversal are
slight, but in the average case they are an element to be consid-
ered. To appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords
may prove to be an even more expensive luxury, especially if
there are many documents in a case, for all of these have to be
printed and the bill may run into thousands of pounds. It is
only necessary to give the rules as to security for costs to show
the amount that may be involved in an average case:
"Within one week after the presentation of the petition
security must be given for costs. The security consists of the
appellant's own recognizance to the amount of £500, and either
a payment into the Security Fund Account of the House of
Lords at the Bank of England of £200, or, instead of that pay-
86 Spicer v. Spicer, [1899] P. 38.
87 (1927) 5 TEX. L. REV. 126.
88Ibid. 128.
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ment, the giving of a bond with two sufficient sureties for
£200 .... I'D
In determining the costs of appeal the Court of Appeal has
wide discretion, for under Order 58, r. 4 it has power to make
such order as to the whole or any part of the costs of the appeal
as may be just. As a general rule a successful appellant gets
both his costs of appeal and his costs in the court below,", but
this does not follow where the appellant succeeds on a point not
taken below, or on evidence not before the court below.D2 When
an appeal is unsuccessful, it is generally dismissed with costs,
but under special circumstances the dismissal may be without
costs.92
(j) Discontinuance. The English rules as to costs not only
control actions which are seriously prosecuted, but they also
prevent persons from commencing or defending a suit without
any real intention of bringing it to trial. Under Order 26, r. 1
a plaintiff may, under certain circumstances, discontinue an ac-
tion, but he must pay the defendant's costs. These will include
all the expenses which the defendant has reasonably incurred in
preparing his case up to the time of the discontinuance, such
as money spent in collecting evidence, solicitor and counsel fees,
etc. 3 Under the same Order the court may allow a defendant
to withdraw his defence, but the usual terms are that he must
pay the plaintiff's costs. As a result, an English calendar is
not cluttered with suits that were never intended to be brought
to trial. With this can be compared the following statement in
the 1926 Report of the Massachusetts Judicial Council:
"In their First Report the Judicial Council called attention to
the fact that there is too much litigation in the Courts of the
Commonwealth and suggested that if justice were done by re-
quiring substantial costs between party and party the amount
of it would be decreased.
"The truth of this statement has received a striking confirma-
tion since then by the number of cases in the Superior Court
which were dismissed for want of prosecution under Rule or
General Order in the year ending June 30, 1926.
"The number thus dismissed was 9,257." 04
89 INDERMAUR, MANUAL OF PRACTICE (10th ed. 1919) 355.
90 Olivant v. Wright, 45 L. J. Ch. 1 (1876) ; cf. North London and General
Property Co. v. Moy, Ltd., [1918] 2 K. B. 439.
91 Hussey v. Horne-Payne, 8 Ch. D. 670 (1878) ; Chard v. Jervis, 9 Q. B.
D. 178 (1881); Arnot's Case, 36 Ch. D. 702 (1887); Ex parte Hauxwoll,
23 Ch. D. 626 (1883).
92 Jones v. Merionethshire Benefit Building Society, [1892] 1. Ch. 173;
Simpson v. Crowle, [1921] 3 K. B. 243; Ex parte Walton, 17 Ch. D. 740
(1887); Farquharson v. Morgan, [1894] 1 K. B. 557.
93 See ANNUAL PRACTICE (1929) 1342.
94 At 47.
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(k) Payment into cozrt. The English rules favor as far as
possible the settlement of actions before trial so that the time
of the court shall not be unnecessarily occupied and expense to
the parties may be avoided. Order 22, r. 6 is an ingenious, and
frequently successful, means of attaining this result. "The
object of this innovation is to provide a medium of compromise
for cases where the defendant is willing to pay something for
the sake of peace, rather than incur the expense and risk of
proving he is not at fault." - A defendant before trial may, in
satisfaction of the claim or without admitting liability, pay a
sum of money into court which the plaintiff is free to accept or
refuse. If he refuses it and proceeds to trial, and does not
recover more than the sum paid into court, he will, as a rule, be
deprived of his costs of the issues as to liability. If he accepts
the payment, he receives, under Order 22, r. 7, the general costs
of the action down to the time of payment inY
(1) Liability of solicitors. A rule which fortunately does not
have to be frequently applied is Order 65, r. 11 which provides
that a: solicitor may be ordered to pay or bear personally any
costs which have been incurred on account of his delay or mis-
conduct. Thus a solicitor may have to bear the costs of litigation
unreasonably commenced ' It is interesting in this connection
to read the following recommendation in the Final Report to the
Appellate Division, Second Department, New York, by the Com-
mittee on "Ambulance Chasing."
"In certain instances it seems deplorable that costs cannot be
assessed personally against the lawyer who flagrantly prosecutes
baseless suits. Some measure of responsibility should be placed
upon him. He should be driven to consider the merits of a claim
before he institutes an action. If his own professional honor
and common sense will not supply the motive to scrutinize claims
carefully, and if money is the only object in his mind, then it is
a great pity that he himself cannot be reached and cannot be
subjected to a money penalty when he goes counter to the most
basic canon of his profession."
(m) Since the County Courts have been established, it has
been the aim of the law to have all cases involving sums of less
than £100 tried there rather than in the High Court. This has
the advantage of saving the time of the High Court while also
enabling the litigants to settle their disputes in a less expensive
manner. A plaintiff may, however, in many cases defeat this
provision by making a claim for more than £100 even though he
9 5 ROSENBAUM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 96.
96 Powell v. Vickers' Sons & Maxim, Ltd., [1907] 1 K. B. 71; Fitzgerald
v. Thos. Tilling, Ltd., 96 L. T. 718 (1907); Langridge v. Campbell, 2 Ex.
D. 281 (1877).
97 Re Dartnall, [1895] 1 Ch. 474; Batten v. Wedgwood & Co., 31 Ch. D.
346 (1875) ; Shorter v. Tod-Heatly, supra note 67.
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knows that he will not be able to recover that amount. To pre-
vent this the County Courts Act, 1919,08 provides that if an
action is brought in the High Court which could have been com-
menced in a County Court; then, if the plaintiff recovers less
than forty pounds in an action founded on contract or less than
ten pounds in an action founded on tort, he shall not be entitled
to any costs of the action.
CONCLUSION
The above list of instances in which costs are used as a means
of controlling litigation is not intended to be an exhaustive one.
It would be possible to refer to other Orders in the Rules of the
Supreme Court, and to other statutes, as for example the Public
Authorities Protection Act, 1893,91 in which there are important
provisions on this matter. It is hoped, however, that by what
has been said the fundamental importance of costs in English
procedure has been made sufficiently clear. To describe these
rules of practice without mentioning costs is like describing the
engine of an automobile without mentioning the fact that it
runs on gasoline. The English law is essentially practical, and
is based on the pessimistic assumption that some litigants will
resort to all possible technicalities and sharp practices to gain
their ends if they are not prevented from doing so. It therefore
makes adequate provision to see that a plaintiff will not find it
profitable to rush into court with a groundless or trumpery claim
on the chance that the defendant will prefer to pay this legal
form of blackmail rather than incur the expense of fighting the
case. It also makes provision so that it will cost a defendant
dear to obstruct an action as long as possible, and, after judg-
ment, to appeal to as many courts as are open to him, on the
chance that he may tire out the plaintiff. It is true that under
the English system a party is still free to raise a number of
technical objections, refuse to admit anything, and force his
opponent to prove facts which are not in dispute, but if he does
so he will have to pay, and pay heavily. Substantial costs make
it expensive for the party who adopts such tactics. These costs
are an additional weapon of offense for the plaintiff with a just
claim to present, and a shield to the defendant who has been
unfairly brought into court.
COSTS IN AMERICA
It is impossible in this article to discuss at any length the
history and present state of the rules as to costs in the United
98 9 & 10 GEO. V, c. 73 (1919). See County Courts Act, 51 & 52 VICT. C.
43 (1888).
go 56 & 57 VidT. c. 61 (1893). Under this act, judgment for tho defend-
ant carries costs between solicitor and client.
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States. A number of interesting questions may, however, be
suggested. Why do the American rules differ so fundamentally
from the English ones? Is the difference due merely to the acci-
dent of historical development, or is it based on some fundamen-
tal dissimilarity in social and economic conditions? Was the
change from the English" common-law practice-for it must be
remembered that the English law of costs was in existence long
before the settlement of America-a conscious or an unconscious
one when the common-law was established in the Colonies? No
attempt can be made here to answer these questions, but the
following suggestions are tentatively advanced.
During most of the Colonial period IaTers were held in
suspicion. This has been well described by Mr. Warren:
"In everT one of the Colonies, practically throughout the
Seventeenth Century, a lawyer or attorney was a character of
disrepute and of suspicion, of whose standing or power in the
community the ruling class, whether it was the clergy as in New
England, or the merchants as in New York, Maryland and Vir-
ginia, or the Quakers as in Pennsylvania, was extremely jealous.
In many of the Colonies, persons acting as attorneys were for-
bidden to receive any fee; in some, all paid attorneys were
barred from the courts; in all, they were subjected to the most
rigid restrictions as to fees and procedure." I'll
If lawyers were "characters of disrepute," it would hardly be
reasonable to expect the law to encourage them by awarding
costs to include counsel fees. It must also be remembered that
during this period a knowledge of the law was not felt to be an
essential in the administration of justice. Many of the judges
were laymen without experience in legal matters. The law, it
was felt, was not a science but a body of rules which any intelli-
gent man could understand. It would follow that for a litigant
to employ a lawyer to present his case was to take a step which
was not essential.
By the end of the eighteenth, and the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, the bar had become more respectable, and it was
the practice for parties to be represented by counsel. In some
of the states, such as New York for example, counsel fees were
allowed as costs. However, due perhaps to the earlier suspicion
of lawyers, these were measured by a fixed sum. Thus the
Revised Statutes of 1829 contained a large number of provisions
dealing with counsel fees, but in every case the amount to be
allowed was prescribed.-I The retaining fee was fixed at three
dollars and seventy-five cents, and the same amount was given
for arguing a cause. It may be suggested that at this time the
fees allowed as costs approximated the actual fees charged by
loo WARREN, Al HISTORY OF THE ABIERcAN BAR (1913) 4.
Lo1N. Y. REV. STAT. (1829) c. 10, § 4 reads:
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the lawyer to his client for, in the absence of agreement, these
statutory fees were taken, in case of dispute, to be the proper
test for a lawyer's bill.102 As the taxable costs were fixed in
amount, the difference between the statutory fee and the actual
fee paid by the client increased as the lawyers raised their
charges, until in time they had no real relation to each other."3
Perhaps if the New York Code in 1829, instead of providing a
fixed fee in every case, had allowed the successful party a rea-
sonable counsel fee depending upon the nature of the litigation,
its system would have developed along the lines of the present
English one.
Apart from purely historical reasons, the American rules as
to costs may also be due in part to a vague feeling that they
favor the poor man, and are therefore democratic, while the
English system helps the wealthy litigant. The argument is
that by imposing a liability for costs upon the losing party a
poor man 104 "might often become a prey of a dishonest adversary
from sheer want of funds to protect his rights." This view is
due to a confusion between costs and fees.'05 It is obvious that
if the court fees are large, then a plaintiff, who cannot afford
to pay them, will necessarily be prevented from seeking the
assistance of the law, for the fees must be paid before the action
"Retaining fee, three dollars and seventy-five cents, to one counsel only;
Perusing, amending, and signing every petition of appeal, and every
answer to a petition of appeal, two dollars and fifty cents;
Perusing and amending every other petition to the court, in a case
where an appeal is pending, or in which a writ of error shall have been
brought, one dollar and twenty-five cents;
Perusing, amending and settling every special pleading, entry or order,
one dollar and fifty cents;
Attending the court to make or oppose a motion, or to present or oppose
a petition, one 4ollar and twenty-five cents;
Arguing every special motion or petition, two dollars and fifty cents;
Arguing every cause, or attending for such argument pursuant to notice,
three dollars and seventy-five cents;
But the foregoing fees shall be allowed only to one counsel on each side,
who shall have been actually employed and rendered the service charged."
102 Scott v. Elmendorf, 12 Johns. 315 (N. Y. 1815); Brooklyn Bank v.
Willoughby, 3 Super. Ct. 669 (N. Y. 1847); Brady v. Mayor, etc. of New
York, 3 Super. Ct. 569 (N. Y. 1848); Starin v. Mayor, etc. of New York, 106
N. Y. 82 (1887).
1032 ABBoTT, N w YoRK CYCLOPEDIC DIGEST (1901) 232. "The taxable
costs are not now the measure of the attorney's compensation,"
104 W. Watson, A Rationale of the Law of Costs (1893) 16 CENT. L. 3.
306.
105 It is unfortunate, for example, that Mr. Reginald Heber Smith in his
excellent report "Justice and the Poor," published by the Carnegie Founda-
tion for the Advancement of Teaching, fails to distinguish between court
fees and costs. His criticism of "costs" is to a large extent concerned with
fees. He fails to see, therefore, that a proper system of costs may be of
great benefit to the poor litigant.
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is commenced. But as the losing party does not have to pay the
costs until after the action has been determined he is not thereby
precluded from prosecuting his claim. Experience in England
has shown that it is the wealthy defendant who suffers under
this system for if he loses he will have to pay the plaintiff's
costs, while if he wins he will not be able to collect his own
from his unsuccessful and impecunious adversary. It is only
where the law requires that a plaintiff, before commencing an
action, shall give security for costs that the poor man is at a
disadvantage. Strange to say, it is not in England but in some
of the states, that this unfortunate provision exists. Mr. Smith
has illustrated this in his "Justice and the Poor":
"How the existing system of costs literally forbids resort to
the courts by the poor is illustrated by the laws requiring
security for costs. A plaintiff must not only pay the costs [fees]
for summons, service, entry, trial, judgment, and the like, but
in addition he must, on motion, furnish a bond to guarantee that
the defendant, if successful, shall not be out of pocket [costs].
In the Connecticut law, for example, the bond is in the sum of
fifteen dollars in the City Court of Hartford and seventy-five in
the Superior Court." 21,
To guard against such a denial of justice, the English Rules of
Court are specific that security shall never be required in the
court of first instance on the ground of the plaintiff's poverty.'0 7
The courts are strict in enforcing this rule, even in cases in
which the plaintiff's claim seems to be a hopeless and unjustifi-
able one.10 8  This solicitude for the poor litigant has a long
history, for the first statute on the subject dates from 1495."
3(6 SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919) 28.
( 7 See Order 65, r. 6. The ordinary grounds on -which security for costs
are ordered is residence abroad of the plaintiff, or because the plaintiffs
residence is not stated, or is incorrectly stated, in the writ of summons.
1(3 Knight v. Ponsonby, [1925] 1 K. B. 545. The only exception to the
general rule stated above is found in 51 & 52 ViCT. c. 43, § 6 (1888) which
provides that:
"In any action of tort, on an affidavit that the plaintiff has no visible
means of paying the defendant's costs if plaintiff does not win the action,
the defendant may-unless the plaintiff can satisfy the judge that he has a
cause of action fit to be prosecuted in the High Court--obtain an order for
him to give secdrity for such costs, or for the action to be remitted for
trial to a County Court to be therein named."
But even under this provision security need not be given if the judge is
satisfied that the claim is a substantial one.
109 See 4 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF EGLISH LAW (1924) 537:
"Provision was made in 1495 for the poor man by the introduction of suits
in forma pauperis. A statute of that year provided that poor perzons
should be entitled to writs without payment, and that judges should assign
attorneys and counsel to act without fee. It was provided in 1531 that,
when the unsuccessful plaintiff was a pauper, he should not be compelled
to pay costs under this statute, but should suffer such other punishment
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But the English system of costs is of advantage to the poor
litigant in another way that is less obvious but even more im-
portant. As long as the cost of fighting a case is merely nominal,
as it is under the American practice, the wealthy defendant,
especially if the defendant is a corporation, will frequently refuse
to pay a just claim on the chance of winning on a technicality
or of tiring out the plaintiff. It is the poor man who cannot
afford to wait for his money and can, therefore, be forced to
accept an unfair settlement by fear of long delay. In England
a defendant who knows that he has an uncertain defence to an
action will pay the claim rather than face the danger of incur-
ring heavy costs, while in America, as every lawyer knows, the
courts are clogged both by claims that ought never to have been
brought and by those that ought never to have been defended.
It was primarily on this ground that the Massachusetts Judicial
Council in its 1925 Report favored the English system of sub-
stantial costs:
"The possibility of having to pay the lawyer's bills of both
parties to the action makes a plaintiff think twice before he sues
out a writ and a defendant think twice before he defends an
action which ought not to be defended, and that is a direct deter-
rent on the number of cases put or kept in suit." 110
Another objection to the introduction of substantial costs is
based on the view that the law at best is a gamble, and that it
is unfair to penalize the losing party. Perhaps this is a result
of the sporting theory of justice so well described by Dean
as appeared reasonable to the judges. In the seventeenth century the prac-
tice appears to have been to tax the costs, and, if the costs were not paid,
the court could adjudge that the plaintiff be whipped. But after the Revo-
lution this practice seems to have been gradually discontinued. Holt C. J.,
on a motion that a pauper be whipped for non-payment of costs on a non-
suit, refused, saying that 'he had no officer for this purpose and never knew
it done.'"
110 FIRST REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETTS (1925)
63-64.
Unfortunately in the 1926 report the Judicial Council shelves the idea of
costs, and substitutes in its place a recommendation on increased court fees,
"While it is true, as we said a year ago, that the substantial costs betv.een
party and party would diminish the volume of litigation 'there is another
policy which will have that effect if adopted by -the Legislature. This other
policy will give relief to the general taxpayer." The Council then recom-
mends a considerable increase in court fees.
Although such an increase in the fees will undoubtedly decrease the
amount of litigation, it will do nothing to affect the unfairness of the pres-
ent system so well pointed out in the 1925 report. Nor will it prevent the
parties from raising every technical objection, delaying the action whenever
such a course is advantageous, filing great numbers of interrogatories, re-
fusing to admit anything, forcing the opponent to prove facts which are
not in dispute, and appealing against every adverse judgment.
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Pound.-' It is unfair to hit a man when he is down, and to give
costs against the man who has lost seems to be perilously like it.
This view has been strongly put in a recent article by Mr.
Satterthwaite:
"The scheme urged [the loser to pay all costs] is based on the
wholly unwarranted assumption that the losing party in litiga-
tion is always, or even ordinarily, in the wrong. Its sole jus-
tification must be that an adverse verdict by a jury or an unfa-
vorable decision of the Court carries with it the necessary
conclusion that the defeated party was morally culpable in
bringing action, or in resisting suit, as the case may be. Nothing
could be further from the actual facts of life.
"An enlightened Judge must realize that, in spite of his most
conscientious and painstaking efforts, he is, in a given ease, as
like as not to do injustice when he seeks to do justice." 1"-
Is not the answer to this that the costs must be paid by one
party or the other, and that, in spite of M1r. Satterthwaite's pes-
simism, it is at least more probable that the losing party was in
the wrong? If New Jersey justice is so much a matter of luck,
it hardly seems worthwhile to have courts and lawyers; it would
be cheaper, and certainly less dilatory, to spin a coin.
There are, however, two objections to the adoption of the Eng-
lish system of costs as a whole which the writer considers more
serious. The first one is a question of form. An English bill
of costs goes into unnecessary details. As has been pointed out,
every step, however minute and unimportant, is carefully listed
and separately charged. Such meticulous exactitude could be
avoided by allowing a lump sum for the numerous small items.
On this point the Massachusetts Judicial Council has said:
"Though the principle of the English system of costs ought
to be adopted, the system in detail would not and ought not to
be made part of our jurisprudence. It is enough to read an
English bill of costs to be convinced of that." 13
The second objection is more fundamental. To allow the judge
or the taxing Master such wide discretion as is inherent in the
English system would be contrary to the general American con-
ception of a judiciary bound by fixed rules. As the English judge
has discretion both as to whether costs will be allowed and as to
their quantum, it is obvious that the power given to him is con-
siderable. It would, however, be possible to adopt a modified
system of substantial costs which, while limiting to some extent
the discretionary element, would nevertheless prevent the abuse
of the legal process which follows from the American system.
M11 THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMIION LAW (1921) 127.
32 Satterthwaite, Increasing Costs to be Paid by Losing Party (1923) 4G
N. J. L. J. 133.
T13 Supra note 110.
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Finally it may be noted that a number of recent federal and
state statutes include provisions giving substantial costs to the
successful party. 14 Thus the Clayton Act nI- allows the success-
ful plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees from the
defendant. In Scherzer v. Keller',6 the opinion lists six in-
stances in Illinois in which attorneys' fees are now made recov-
erable by one of the parties. These are, however, only isolated
instances, and do not indicate that the use of substantial costs as
a means of decreasing unfair and unnecessary litigation has been
seriously considered in this country.
14 15 C. J. 114.
115 See 38 STAT. 731, § 4 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1926).
116 321 Ill. 324, 151 N. E. 915 (1926).
